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BAR BRIEFS
(Continued Frome First Page)
and unjust, is government by men and not government by law.
It is Roman administrative law. When a legislative body has set
up such a system it finds it difficult to undo what it has done, because the chief executive has the power of veto.
Mr. Roosevelt takes the view of the other social planners that
you can't conduct administrative government affecting all the affairs of the people if you permit the people to carry their appeals
into a court for a review of the facts and of the rulings based upon
them. Government business has become the biggest business in
the country and affects all other business, determining conduct
and the relations of one person to another. Executive authority
demands freedom from the restraints which the courts of law put
upon it.
That is another way of saying that such a government is a
dictatorship and must work as one. If administrative law is in
the hands of fair minded men its operation may be as fair as circumstances will permit, but whether it is fair or unfair its word
is final and if it does an injustice the injury is without a legal
remedy. This theory is contrary to all previous thinking of the
American people who, until they were taken in hand by the New
Deal, had been careful to preserve for each man his day in court.
The new system of administrative law and the old system of
protected liberties can't live together. It's quite apparent now
which one is getting the worse of it.
SEC.
INVITATION
The members of the Association are invited to attend a conference of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals to be held
at the United States Court House in St. Louis, Mo., on March 7th,
1941. An open session will be held, at which time Justice Bolitha
J. Laws, of the District Court of the District of Columbia, will deliver an address on Pretrial Procedure and Henry P. Chandler,
director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts,
will also deliver an address.
CASE NOTES-CONTRACTS TO ADOPT
In the United States adoption exists only by statute, and apparently the general rule is that the statute must be strictly construed and followed. In re Session's Estate, 70 Mich. 297, 38
N. W. 249 (1888) ; In re Estate of Williamson, 205 Iowa 772, 218
N. W. 469 (1928). However, because of the hardships which may
arise from such a rule, courts have in many instances liberalized,
if not, substantially .altered its effect. Rockford v. Bailey, 322
Mo. 1155, 17 S. W. (2d) 941 (1929). In some jurisdictions substantial compliance is held to be sufficient.
It is said that adoption, being recognized by statute is no
longer contrary to public policy as at common law, and that if an
express promise of inheritance is enforceable, it necessarily re-
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sults that an implied promise, assumed from the acts and intentions of the parties, can also be enforced. The question involved
in many of these cases resolves itself into one of evidence and
proof sufficient to establish such implied contracts. However,
where there has been no legal adoption, the agreement to adopt
may be drawn from the acts and conduct of the parties. Chehak
v. Battles, 133 Iowa 107, 110 N. W. 330 (1907); Crawford v. Wilson, 139 Ga. 654, 78 S. E. 30 (1913) ; Hickox v. Johnston, 113 Kan.
99, 213 Pac. 1060 (1923) ; Roberts v. Roberts, 223 Fed. 775 (1915).
Contracts to adopt are of two distinct types, namely, an executory contract to adopt and an executed contract or agreement
of adoption. The latter constitutes an act of adoption, in some
jurisdiction, the result of which is equivalent to that of judicial
proceedings prescribed in the majority of the states, and by it the
child who is the subject of the agreement becomes, in legal effect,
the child of the contracting party. An executory contract or
agreement to adopt does not, in and of itself, make the child an
heir of the promisor. 1 Am. Jur. Adoption of Children, sec. 15.
While the cases are not in entire harmony, in most jurisdictions,
executory contracts to adopt, not performed by effectual adoption proceedings during the life of the adoptive parent, will, upon
the latter's death, be enforced to the extent of decreeing that the
child occupies in equity the status of an adopted child, or, at least,
is entitled to such right of inheritance from the estate of the
adoptive parent, as a natural child would enjoy, where the child
in question has fully and faithfully performed the duties of a
child to the adoptive parent, and the circumstances require the
relief as a matter of justice and equity. Roberts v. Roberts,
supra; Odenbreit v. Othein, 131 Minn. 56, 154 N. W. 741 (1915).
Contracts to adopt may be in several forms, either written or
oral. An oral contract to adopt, so far as it relates to the establishment of relations of paternity and filiation, is generally regarded as valid nor is such a contract rendered invalid by statutory provisions requiring the execution of wills to be in writing.
Chehak v. Battles, supra. Contracts of this nature may be taken
out of the statute of frauds by the part performance thereof by
the parties, where such proof of part performance is clear and
unequivocal and is clearly applicable to the contract in question.
Laird v. Vila, 93 Minn. 45, 100 N. W. 656, 43 L. R. A. 427 (1904).
The consideration necessary to support such contracts of
adoption may be any consideration sufficient to support an ordinary contract, may consist of the surrender of the child by the
natural parent, the marriage to the adopting parent of the other
party to the contract, or the performance of services by the child.
Where the child performs such duties and services required and
is never legally adopted according to statutory adoption proceedings, courts of equity will enforce any property rights or rights
of inheritance in favor of the child upon the death of the alleged
parents, if the facts and circumstances brought in the evidence,
including the acts of the parties, are such as to raise a convincing
implication that such contract was actually made and to satisfy
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the court of its terms and performances. Odenbreit v. Uthein,
supra; Lynn v. Hockaday, 162 Mo. 11, 61 S. W. 885 (1901).
Equity will decree that to be done which should have been done.
In many states contracts of adoption must be shown by the
strength and cogency of evidence to conclusively exist. Johnson
v. Antry, 5 S. W. (2d) 405 (Mo. 1928). The courts in these states
take the position that in enforcing such implied contracts upon
mere parole or oral evidence an opportunity is left open for the
working of fraud upon the estates of deceased persons by those
who have been befriended and cared for by them during their lifetime, but never legally adopted as provided for under the existing
statutes. Henry v. Taylor, 16 S. D. 424, 93 N. W. 641 (1903);
Brasch v. Reeves, 124 Minn. 114, 144 N. W. 744 (1913); In re
Hack's Estate, 166 Minn. 35, 207 N. W. 17 (1926). It would seem
from this line of authorities that regardless of the conclusiveness
of the evidence to support such implied contract, it would not be
given effect. These same jurisdictions should tend toward liberality of such decisions wherein justice demanded it.
In the recent case of Homer v. Larson, 293 N. W. 836 (N. D.
1940) our Supreme Court, in holding against the parties maintaining that they were adopted children of the deceased through
an agreement to the statute, said:
"The decedent took the children into his home, called them
his adopted children, presented them for confirmation in the
church as his adopted children, and evidently considered that they
were adopted. No written contract for adoption is in evidence,
and there is not sufficient evidence to show any terms of such
contract with reference to distribution, or to gifts, or grants of
property. There are general statements to the effect that the
children were taken for adoption and were to be adopted and to be
treated as the children of the decedent. However, there being
no evidence whatever showing compliance with the statutory requirements relative to adoption, such children cannot now be said
to be the adopted children of the deceased."
It would appear from this decision that North Dakota follows
the line of decisions construing strict adherence to adoption
statutes in order to enforce rights coming to an adopted person,
where no written contract of adoption is in evidence.
In construing the rights of adopted persons it would seem to
be a sound and acceptable rule that although the mechanical or
statutory provisions of an adoption were not specifically complied
with, the acts and intentions of the parties should, in most cases,
be given weight in order to do justice and equity to all involved.
A person's intentions' may have been to adopt and make a child his
own, but through negligence in conforming to statutory procedure
of adoption such was not done. Would it not seem just in such
a case that a contract implied from the intention and acts of the
deceased be given effect and the adoption allowed?
Courts of
equity in many jurisdictions have so held.
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Whether or not contracts of adoption are valid and enforceable often resolves itself into a question of the sufficiency and
conclusiveness of the evidence available. Roberts v. Roberts,
supra; Hickox v. Johnston, 113 Kan. 99, 213 Pac. 1060 (1923).
Many of the cases where the intention and acts of the parties
must be shown to make an oral or implied contract have little evidence and much of it is conflicting and not conclusive. In such
cases courts of equity have carefully adjudged the available evidence and have attempted to construe such contract in a manner
that would be just and equitable to all parties concerned.
JOHN M. CASHEL,
Third Year Law Student,
University of North Dakota.
OUR SUPREME COURT HOLDS
In Leo DeRochford, et al., Pltfs. and Applts., v. Bismarck Banking Company, a corporation, et al., Defts. and Respts.
That the court's instructions to the jury are to be considered in their entirety, when portions thereof are specified as error; and upon a review of the
specifications of alleged error in the instructions given in this case, is held
that when the instructions as given are considered as a whole, no reversible
error has been shown.
That where the evidence on the issue of a contract of agency said to exist between H., one of the defendants, and the plaintiffs in this case is squarely in conflict, the verdict of the jury finding for the defendants and against
the plaintiffs on this issue is decisive.
That an order of the trial court denying a motion for a new trial based
upon the insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict will not be disturbed where it appears that there is substantial conflict in the testimony and
the discretion of the trial court in passing upon the motion for a new trial
was not abused.
Appeal from the District Court of Burleigh County; Hon. R. G. McFarland, J.
AFFIRMED. Opinion of the Court by Swenson, District Judge, sitting in
place of Burke, J. disqualified.
In State of North Dakota, Pltf. and Respt., v., M. W. Dimmick, Deft.
and Applt.
That no error can be predicated upon the admission of competent evidence bearing directly on the issue of fact involved in the case.
That error can not be predicated upon the refusal of the trial court, at
the close of the state's case, to advise an acquittal.
That corrobation of an accomplice requires the production of such other
evidence as tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense charged, and it is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the
offense. Evidence is examined, and it is held: that the independent testimony furnished in the case at bar, if believed by the jury, is sufficient to
meet the requirements of corroboration.
That evidence examined and it is held: that the verdict of the jury is
amply sustained by the evidence produced.
Appeal from the District Court of Cass County, Hon. M. J. Englert, Judge.
AFFIRMED. Opinion of the Court by Burr, Ch. J.

